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ABSTRACT
This contribution builds upon Anne Booth’s extensive work on the differentiated 
evolution of colonial education systems in East and Southeast Asia. The article probes 
further into the underlying causes of the poor Dutch legacy. It is basically argued 
that the spread of popular education was not only hampered by a lack of financial 
commitment, but also by notable inequalities in the allocation of funds for education 
and a great reluctance to support initiatives in investment in private education, which, 
I think, should be interpreted as the result of the metropolitan commitment to secular 
colonial rule in an overwhelmingly Islamic society.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the highlights of Anne Booth’s impressive scholarly oeuvre is her book 
Colonial Legacies. Economic and Social Development in East and Southeast 
Asia, published in 2007. This comparative study of the long-term impact of 
colonial rule can be regarded as the culmination of decades of research on a 
wide range of topics relating to Indonesian historical development, a research 
agenda that she has extended to the entire region of East and Southeast Asia, 
an agenda that has recently incorporated the Asia-Africa comparison, too 
(Booth 2013).Apart from assessing the highly important questions of colonial 
legacies, Colonial Legacies is exemplary for Booth’s lucid style of presentation 
style, her crystal-clear way of synthesizing large sets of comparative socio- 
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economic data, her subtle application of political economic theory in order to 
differentiate between the general and the specific, and her fine-grained intuition 
for identifying the key factors in path-dependent development processes.
One of the recurrent themes in Colonial Legacies is the differentiated evolution 
of colonial education systems in East and Southeast Asia. The literature in the 
1990s on the ‘East Asian miracle’ had singled out Asian education systems 
as one of the primary determinants of a particular ‘Asian model’ of modern 
economic growth (World Bank 1993, Birdsall, Ross & Sabot 1997, Cummings 
1995, Campos & Root 1996). By contrast, Booth argues that the orthodox view 
suffers from gross overgeneralization (Booth 2003: 148-149; Booth 1999). 
Whereas in East Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
education clearly preceded rising demand, there is much less evidence that 
growth leaned heavily on exante investment in education among the Southeast 
Asian Newly Industrializing Economies. 
This point is particularly relevant to Indonesia, which inherited one of the 
poorest, if not the poorest colonial education system in Southeast Asia (Booth 
2003: 159). In her earlier work Booth discussed the weak Dutch legacy in 
education as part of a history of ‘missed opportunities’ (Booth 1998). Although 
there has been a rapid catch-up in access to primary and secondary schooling in 
Indonesia since independence, the quality of the Indonesian educational system 
is still extremely poor. In various rounds of PISA surveys, conducted between 
2000 to 2012, Indonesian students scored at the bottom of international 
reading, science and mathematics scales (OECD 2013). This low international 
ranking may, at least partially, be attributed to the quantity-quality trade-off 
invoked by the rapid expansion of schooling since the early 1970s, when 
substantial oil revenues started to flow into the education system. Yet, for the 
deeper causes we have to step back into the colonial era.
That the Dutch legacy was poor is not a new insight. This was already 
observed and commented upon by contemporaries (Brugmans 1938, 
Hartgerink 1942, Furnivall 1943). The question why Dutch education policies 
differed from those in neighbouring colonies is not that simple. A complete 
answer would require, amongst others, an analysis of both supply and demand 
factors, a closer inspection of religious issues and related conceptions of 
gender roles, a closer look at the role of Christian missionary schools and a 
review of political debates on the function and implementation of education 
programs in the mother country.
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This contribution does not pretend to offer an all-embracing answer to the why 
question, but it seeks to exploit the comparisons with other colonies in Asia 
and Africa colonies arguing, first, that the spread of popular education was 
not only hampered by a lack of financial commitment by the Dutch colonial 
government, but also by notable inequalities in the allocation of funds to 
education and a reluctance to support private education investment initiatives, 
for instance in the case of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Kwan primary schools set up 
by the ethnic Chinese community in the Netherlands Indies in March 1900. In 
addition, I argue that we should interpret such reluctance in the context of a 
metropolitan commitment to the principle of laïcité (laicism, also often denoted 
as secularism). The idea of state neutrality in religious affairs was scrupulously 
maintained in an overwhelmingly Islamic society.
SOME STYLIZED FACTS
In comparison to the development of formal education in the other Northeast 
and Southeast Asian countries the Indonesian experience can be sketched by 
a number of ‘stylized facts’. First, the expansion of education under Dutch 
colonial rule remained far below its maximum potential. If the colonial 
government would have accepted the budgetary consequences of the 
educational policies adopted by, for instance, the Americans in the Philippines 
or the Japanese in Taiwan and Korea, access to all levels of education would 
have opened up much faster. In his classic study on Educational Progress 
in Southeast Asia, Furnivall (1943) neatly sums up the varied performance 
before 1940 (Table 1). Together with French Indochina and British Burma, the 
Netherlands Indies recorded the lowest enrolment rates in primary education, 
not to mention the virtually negligible enrolment in post-primary education. 
A comparison with Thailand, the only country in the Southeast Asia that 
developed an educational system under an independent administration –which 
is not the same as saying that it was isolated from foreign influences - also 
endorses the poor Dutch legacy.
The  ‘unrecognized  schools’ in  the  second  column  of  Table  1  refer  to 
schools that were not officially recognized by the colonial authorities. In 
the Netherlands Indies the lion’s share of these schools consisted of Islamic 
boarding schools (pesantren) and mosque schools (madrasah), offering classes 
in religious philosophy and spiritual training (meditation), Koran recitation (in
Ewout Frankema| Why was the Dutch Legacy So Poor? 
00-MI-39,-No 2-2013.indd   309 02/06/2014   15:42:19
310 | Masyarakat Indonesia, Volume 39, No. 2, Desember 2013
Arabic), martial arts, and a variety of manual skills (Steenbrink 1974). Among 
the schools set up by indigenous Indonesian leaders, mention should also be 
made of the Taman Siswa schools established in Batavia on 3 July 1922 by 
Suwardi Sujaningrat, known as Ki Hadjar Dewantara. I will get back to the 
complicated relationship of the Dutch colonial government with the Islamic 
schools below.
Table 1
Gross Enrolment Rates of Total Population in Southeast Asia, 1936-1939
Recognized primary 
schools
Recognized and 
unrecognized primary 
schools
Netherlands Indies 3.4 4
Malaya 6 7.8
Burma 3.9 5.5
Thailand 9.7 10.7
Indo-China (Fr.) 2.1 2.5
Taiwan (Jap.) 11.2 11.4
Philippines (US) 10.8 11.5
Source: Furnivall 1943: 111.
Note: Recognized schools are schools recognized by the colonial authorities, but not necessarily receiving 
state subsidies. The information provided by Furnivall on the unrecognized schools excluded from official 
statistical records is based on ‘educated guesses’. 
Although the British are often regarded to have pursued more ‘benign’ 
educational policies than other colonial powers, I have elsewhere argued that 
this claim is difficult to maintain in view of the vast intra-imperial differences 
in educational development across British Africa (Frankema 2012). This 
argument can be extended to Asia as well. The major distinction in educational 
investment was not between the various European colonial powers, but rather 
between the European colonial powers on the one hand, and non-European 
colonial powers on the other. Indeed, British investments were quite meagre 
compared to the Japanese and American involvement in education. The 
British hardly had a better record than the French or the Dutch, especially if 
we consider that access to primary education in British India - not included 
in Furnivall’s study, but by far the largest British colony in the region - was 
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more or less comparable to the Netherlands Indies up to 1940 (Van Leeuwen 
2007: 265-268).
The comparison of primary and secondary school enrolment rates between 
Indonesia and the Philippines (Figure 1) reveals a second, important stylized 
fact. There was a clear break in the long-term development of school 
enrolment expansion after Indonesian independence, which did not occur in the 
Philippines. The looming prospect of independence after the defeat of Japan 
initiated a mere revolution in Indonesian educational access. Although the data 
constructed on the basis of official statistics may overstate the actual increase, 
there can be little doubt that this big push to school enrolment constituted a 
break with the colonial pattern. Secondary schooling expanded at exponential 
rates during the 1950s and, not much later, tertiary school enrolment rates 
started to take off as well. This change in the trend should not only be regarded 
as a rapid increase in supply, it also reflected the perceived economic value 
of basic skills, such as literacy and numeracy, spurring demand for schooling. 
Changing prospects of social mobility emerged after the demise of the ‘old’ 
colonial elites, opening up lucrative vacancies in administration and business, 
while rapid public sector growth was adding a large number of well-paid jobs 
(Ricklefs 2008).
A third stylized fact refers to a number of structural inequalities in the colonial 
education system. The gender gap in school enrolment was comparatively 
large. Around 1920 primary school enrolment rates of boys and girls in Japan 
had been close to parity, whereas in colonial Indonesia the ratio was at best 4 
to 1 (Van Leeuwen 2007: 264-265, 270-271). In the Philippines the gender gap 
was much smaller as well, with rates of 1.3 to 1 in primary schools (Statistical 
Bulletin 1926). Furthermore, there existed a peculiar type of regional inequality. 
Literacy rates were higher in the outer regions than in the central areas. In 1930 
indigenous male and female literacy in islands outside Java stood at 13.4 and 
4.0 per cent respectively against 9.7 and 1.4 per cent in Java. Interestingly, 
for the Chinese minority rates were the opposite, with 33.2 and 7.7 per cent 
in the islands outside Java and 47.5 and 16.0 per cent in Java (Furnivall 
1943:76). These figures reveal the impact of the long-term presence of 
Christian missionary schools in the outer provinces. Apparently, the increased 
investment in mass education in the first decades of the twentieth century 
had been insufficient to brush away this missionary legacy.
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Gross primary and secondary school enrolment rates in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, 1880-2010
Figure 1
Gross primary and secondary school enrolment rates in Indonesia and 
the Philippines, 1880-2010
Source: Indonesia 1880-1969: van Leeuwen 2007: 264-266, 1970-2010: World Development Indicators 
2012; the Philippines 1898-1970: Mitchell 2007, 1971-2009: World Development Indicators 2012. 
Note: The figure excludes enrolment in unrecognized schools. School enrolment rates for the Philip-
pines up to 1970 were computed by dividing total numbers enrolled from  Handbook of Philippine Statistics, 
1903-1959 and Mitchell (2007), by a constructed age-group share of 15-18 per cent of total population for 
the primary school-age (6-11 years) and 10-12 per cent for the secondary school-age (12-15 years). Total 
population figures from Maddison 2010.
Finally, there existed considerable gaps in ethnic enrolment and literacy rates. 
Of course, most of the Dutch children and a large part of the Indo-European 
children were enrolled in European schools, where they were taught the 
standard Dutch primary school curriculum. But there was also a considerable 
gap between the Chinese and Indonesians. This gap shows up much clearer 
in literacy rates, than in the officially recorded school enrolment rates. This 
may point to an important role for home education among the Chinese, which 
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would square with the fact that the Chinese were the first to exert pressure on 
the colonial authorities for support of the expansion of Chinese schools.
Such structural inequalities are important for the argument I wish to develop 
in the remainder of this article, as they reflect the outcome of a heated political 
debate on how to integrate popular indigenous education into the existing, 
more advanced, but also rather expensive system of European education which 
had been designed for the children of the Dutch, Chinese and indigenous elites. 
Until the late nineteenth century popular education (volksonderwijs) had been 
left almost entirely to the private market. One of the central issues was whether 
or not the indigenous Islamic schools and the Christian missionary schools had 
to be integrated into the system of public education. Should they be eligible to 
state funding or not? If yes, what demands would then be posed with respect 
to the curriculum and to which extent should the colonial state get involved in 
teacher training? All these questions emerged against the background of the 
fundamental question of how the Dutch state, and hence the colonial state, was 
to secure neutrality in religious affairs, that is pursuing the principle of laicism.
The end result of this political and ideological debate, which was mainly 
conducted in the metropolis rather than in the colony, was a highly 
differentiated system of education in which European schools were (p)reserved 
for the elites, while popular education was expanded via secular village schools 
(desa-schools) operating a vernacular education program, serving as a cheap 
and basic alternative to Western education (Brugmans 1938: 302-317, Lelyveld
1996), while the existing Islamic and Christian missionary schools were largely 
excluded from the system of public education. Below I argue that the failure 
of the colonial government to capitalize on private school initiatives was one 
of the reasons for the slow spread of mass-education.
The state-funded Dutch-Chinese school (Hollandsch-Chinesche School; 
HCS) was established in 1908 to prepare children of the Chinese minority 
for a position at intermediary levels of business and public administration. 
The state-funded Dutch-Indonesian School (Hollandsch-Inlandsche School; 
HIS) was founded in 1914 in response to growing discontent regarding the 
limited opportunities for Indonesian children and the privileged position of the 
Chinese. As Figure 2 shows these new school types created the opportunity 
to advance into European secondary and tertiary education (Van der Veur
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1969).Yet, for the large majority of Indonesian children two or three years of 
education in a desa (rural)-school was the maximum they could obtain before the 
1940s, and the children who actually completed these three years of schooling 
still formed a ‘fortunate’ minority within their generation (Boone 1996).
Figure 2
The educational system in the Netherlands Indies in the 1920s
Source: Frankema 2013: 159.
COLONIAL INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION
A brief survey of the development and distribution of educational expenses 
shows how Dutch colonial education policies worked out in practice. In 1864 
the Dutch metropolitan government adopted the so-called comptabiliteitswet, 
a law stipulating that the annual government budget of the Netherlands Indies 
had to be ratified by the Dutch parliament. The tightening of metropolitan 
control on colonial fiscal affairs resulted, amongst others, in the establishment 
of a new department of education (Department van Onderwijs, Eeredienst en 
Nijverheid) with a separate budget. In 1871 the Dutch parliament adopted a 
new education law that sought to uniform the highly scattered and diversified 
indigenous educational systems across the archipelago, and expand the number 
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of teacher training schools under the supervision of the colonial administration 
(Hartegerink 1942: 17-21).The budget for public schooling was raised in steps 
from ca. 300,000 guilders in 1864, to roughly 3 million by the early 1890s. 
These reforms resulted in a gradual expansion of public schools catering 
almost exclusively to the higher social classes.
Figure 3 shows the nominal and real per capita public expenditure on education 
on the left-hand axis. The right-hand axis shows the education expenses as a 
percentage share of total public expenditure in the period 1880-1940. There 
was a marked increase in investment on education after when the government 
started to push the expansion of desa schools. These outlays possible because 
of tax reforms implemented during the 1890 1900s and 1910s, resulting in an 
impressive increase in the overall colonial budget and a heavier tax burden on 
the indigenous population (Meijer Ranneft & Huender 1926, Butcher &Dick 
1993). Nevertheless fact, funding allocated to education still hovered around 
2-3 per cent in 1920, before rising to about 6 per cent during the 1920s. The 
1920s represents the only decade in which the Ethical Policy, launched in 
1901, was backed up by a genuine commitment tore-allocate public resources 
towards education. This commitment quickly gave way to austerity measures 
in the wake of the worldwide economic depression in the 1930s. The share of 
education in total expenditures dropped to the level of the 1880s, whereas real 
per capita expenditures fell by more than 50 per cent, from 0.77 Dutch guilders 
at 1900 prices in 1933 to 0.34 in 1937.
From a global comparative perspective, a share of expenditure on education 
in the range of 3-6 per cent of the total budget was far from impressive. 
An allocation of that size was in fact common among British and French 
colonies in Africa (Frankema 2011, 2012). This may be compared to Japanese 
investment in colonial education in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, where the share of educational expenditure went as high as 10-24 
per cent of the budgets for Taiwan and Korea (Booth 2007:72). The Dutch 
investment effort looks quite bleak.
Table 2 shows that expenditures on education in the Philippines after 1898 
were much larger as well. Converting Dutch guilders and Philippine pesos into 
US dollars using current exchange rates, per capita expenses on education in 
the Philippines appear to have been five times higher in 1908 ($0.06 versus
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$0.30)and still, in 1929, about 3.5 times higher than in the Netherlands Indies 
($0.37 versus $1.31).1 This difference cannot be explained by a lesser fiscal 
capacity in the Netherlands Indies. In both colonies per capita government 
revenue oscillated around $2-3 in 1910, $5-6 in the 1920s and $4-5 in the 
1930s (Booth 2007: 73).
Figure 3
Per capita public expenditure on education (left, guilders) and expen- diture on 
education as a percentage share of total public expenditure (right), 1880-1940
Sources: Nominal education expenditure from Van Leeuwen 2007 [original figures in Jaarcijfers voor het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Koloniën) 1880–1922 and Statistisch jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indië 
1923–1939]; total government expenditure: Creutzberg 1976. Real expenditure based on a retail price index 
from Van der Eng 2002.
Interestingly, expenditure per student enrolled in 1908 was considerably higher 
in the Netherlands Indies. This difference reflects the evolution of the colonial 
education system in the Netherlands Indies in the late nineteenth century, 
which specifically targeted the children of the Dutch elite (Hartgerink 1942). 
1 The peso/dollar exchange rate was fixed at 2:1 throughout the years 1908-1929, as was the 
guilder/rupiah rate at 1:1. The guilder/dollar rate of exchange remained stable at 2.5:1.
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Scarce funds were spent selectively, whereas in the Philippines the focus 
was on popular education right from the start of the American intervention. 
The push for popular education after 1907 did not result in a major shift in 
priorities. European schools kept receiving much more funding per student 
than indigenous village schools or Chinese schools. In other words, the 
expansion of mass-education was financed by budgetary expansion rather 
than by a redistribution of public resources. Indeed, the large inequality 
in the distribution of education expenses remained in place throughout the 
colonial period, and in 1929 the funding gap between European primary 
schools and indigenous primary schools had even grown larger, in both 
absolute and relative terms, than it had been in 1908 (Table 2). In 1929, one- 
half of the budget allocation for education was spent on European education, 
whereas these schools catered to only 10 per cent of total enrolment (Van 
Leeuwen 2007). It should be noted, though, that these government funds were 
increasingly absorbed by Indonesian (elite) children as they formed a growing 
majority in the European primary schools and started to outnumber Dutch 
children in the secondary schools during the 1920s (Van der Veur 1969: 14).
Table 2
Colonial Education Expenditure in Indonesia and the Philippines in
1908 and 1929
1908 1929
Indonesia Philippines Indonesia Philippines
Education as % share of total expenditure  
Education expenditure per capita
Education expenditure per student 
Expenses per student, European primary
Expenses per student, Dutch-Chinese primary
Expenses per student, Indigenous primary 
3.6%
0.06
8.3
19.9
5.4
17.5%
0.30
4.5
4.1%
0.37
13.5
34.3
8.1
5.5
19.7%
1.31
1.44
Sources: Indonesia: 1908: Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Koloniën), 1929: Statistisch 
Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indië. Enrolment and population data for the Philippines: Handbook of 
Philippine Statistics, 1903-1959. Expenditure data on the Philippines 1908 and 1929: Bureau of the Census 
and Statistics, Statistical Bulletin of the Philippines 1, 1918, and Yearbook of Philippine Statistics, 1946.
The bottom-line, however, is that in comparison to the program of mass- 
education in the Philippines, where a standard English-language curriculum 
of four years, followed by three years of intermediate level schooling, 
was the norm, the spread of popular education in the Netherlands Indies was 
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hampered by an unequal allocation of public funds. In the Philippines parents 
were not only obliged to register their children at a local school, the central 
government and municipalities also took care of free school materials and 
made a considerable investment effort in running teacher training schools 
to balance demand and supply. In addition, there were very few American 
children draining the budget. Although the mandatory use of English at public 
schools has been much criticized, it did generate a uniform system of education 
with a certain quality standard (Furnivall 1943). The duality in the education 
system of the Netherlands Indies closely corresponded with the language of 
instruction. In a colonial system where knowledge of Dutch formed the key to 
social and economic mobility, the opportunities to climb the social ladder were 
tightly controlled via the education system.
EXPLAINING THE POOR LEGACY
To understand why the Dutch left such a poor legacy it is useful to confront 
the account of changing priorities of colonial administration over the period 
1870-1942 with some of the particularities of the educational system in the 
Netherlands as well as the Indies, especially with regard to the metropolitan 
debate on financing of confessional schools and the colonial perception of the 
blessings and curses of the growing Islamic education movement.
Inconsistent colonial policies are more likely to arise when the long-term 
priorities of colonial rule are not clearly spelled out. The colonial subject was 
perceived as ‘an alien’ as well as ‘a relative’, and the question to which extent 
this ‘alien relative’ should be treated as ‘equal’ or ‘distinctively different’ 
was highly contested. The Dutch never seriously contemplated a merger of 
Dutch and Indonesian affairs into a single state system, nor did they envisage 
a separation of both countries into sovereign states. The Netherlands Indies 
were conceived as both geographically and culturally too distant from the 
metropolis to become a constituting part of the kingdom. Yet, the idea of future 
Indonesian independence strongly conflicted with the long history of the Dutch 
presence in Southeast Asia and the widespread conviction that the colonial 
connection was of vital importance to the economic and political standing of 
the metropolis.2 Indeed, when the Dutch were forced to recognize Indonesian 
2 The well-known Dutch saying Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren - freely translated as ‘loss 
of the Indies means disaster’- neatly conveys this idea.
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independence in late December 1949 and withdraw their army, they still had 
to make a beginning with the mental adaptation to the profound changes in 
political reality that had taken place in the 1940s (Dick et al. 2002; Ricklefs
2008).
Compared to the Philippine experience, the poor Dutch legacy should be 
seen against the background of very different conceptions of the history, 
objectives and long-term sustainability of colonial rule. Having fought 
a war of independence themselves, the Americans regarded colonial rule 
in the Philippines as a temporary phenomenon with the main purpose of 
preparing Philippine society for a politically independent government based 
on the American values of democracy and liberalism. Mass education was 
the principle means of achieving this goal. Even though the spread of popular 
education was one of the focal points of the Ethical Policy, launched by 
Queen Wilhelmina in 1901, the benefits of this target remained contested. 
Yes, the colonial authorities needed a steady supply of educated state 
employees, doctors, engineers and technicians, as well as a growing sense 
of participation by the indigenous population. But at the same time many 
colonial and metropolitan politicians feared that expanding education would 
fuel anti-colonial sentiments and undermine the colonial order in the long run 
(Lelyveld 1996). Such fears about a growing ‘white-collar proletariat’ were not 
unjustified: the rising nationalist movement engaged increasing numbers of 
young Indonesian intellectuals, who would play a key role in the struggle for 
independence (Frankema 2013).
The lack of an explicit long-term view on the purpose of the colonial 
relationship also comes to light in comparison to the Japanese approach. The 
Japanese clung to the idea of assimilating the Taiwanese and Koreans into 
Japanese society. The Japanese considered full-fledged Japanese education 
as the key to achieving this goal. Hence, the language of instruction had to 
be Japanese, the curriculum was Japanese and many teachers were Japanese 
as well. Obviously, geographical proximity played a key role in the different 
Dutch-Japanese approach. The French administered Algeria as an integral 
part of France, whereas Indochina was part of an overseas empire. And the 
embedding of Ireland as a constituent part of the United Kingdom obviously 
also differed from the way in which British Indian territories were integrated 
into the British Empire.
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But Dutch uncertainty on the guiding principles of the colonial relationship 
increased during the second half the nineteenth century. During the heydays 
of the Cultivation System (1830-1870), the rather simple belief that the colony 
existed for the benefit of the metropolis had prevailed. However, with the 
gradual abolishment of the Cultivation System and mounting criticism of 
the explicit aim of exploitation, the discussion on how to reform the colonial 
relationship opened up a vast range of issues for reconsideration. In the sphere 
of education it was widely agreed upon that the colonial state had to start 
making more substantial investments, but whether these should be targeted 
at the sons of indigenous chiefs or at the common people remained a point of 
debate among liberals of various persuasion. Conservatives dissented in their 
judgment of the blessings and curses of Islamic education. And who was going 
to pay for this? (Hartgerink 1942: 17-21).
Private education initiatives were a special bone of content. In the first 
half of the nineteenth century the colonial authorities largely neglected 
the development of Islamic schools, but controlled settlement of Christian 
missionaries with a license system in order to avoid possible conflicts over 
missionary activities in orthodox Islamic areas. The government gave financial 
support to missionary schools in the Outer Islands, notably the Minahassa 
(North Sulawesi)) and the Moluccas, where the Protestant missionaries had a 
strong position.3 However, the subsidie ordinantie (subsidy ordinance) of 1871 
prohibited state subsidies for confessional schools in the Netherlands Indies. 
This was part of an attempt to bring the finances of colonial education in line 
with metropolitan policy principles. These principles originally stemmed from 
the education reform of 1806, when the Kingdom of Holland was a vassal-state 
of the French Republic. It contained three tenets: education officially became 
a state responsibility; public schools had to conform to state control of their 
curriculum and adopt a grade-based teaching system; and, finally, applying the 
principles of laicism, public schools were allowed to teach secular or general 
Christian virtues, but not to teach orthodox Catholic or Protestant views (Veld 
1987).
These three cornerstones of educational policy were vehemently defended by 
the liberals, who dominated the political spectrum for most of the nineteenth 
3 As Portuguese and Spanish traders, soldiers and missionaries had been active in these areas 
since the sixteenth century, Dutch Protestant missionaries initially concentrated their efforts 
on these areas to drive out ‘papal heresies’ (Hartgerink 1942).
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century, but they were continuously contested by the confessional parties. 
The political struggle over these issues, the so-called schoolstrijd (school 
controversy), would dominate the political debate in the Netherlands for more 
than a century. In 1848 the confessional parties managed to secure the freedom 
of establishing private religious schools, subject to regular quality checks 
executed by state inspectors. However, an amendment to this law in 1857 
stipulated that only secular public schools would be eligible to state funding, 
thereby reconfirming the principle of laïcité. This amendment invoked a new 
struggle over the issue of education finance that lasted for nearly six decades. 
The dispute was finally settled in 1917 when the confessional parties accepted 
the introduction of universal male suffrage in return for equal financial support 
to public secular and religious schools.4
The consequences of the Dutch schoolstrijd for the development of education 
in Indonesia were far-reaching. Since the colonial government was no longer 
allowed to support religious schools, they lost the opportunity to spread 
mass-education through private-public co-financing of village schools. To 
see the implications we make a quick sidestep to several African colonies, 
where education was largely supplied by missionary schools and financed by 
a combination of church funds (donations), local investments (often in-kind or 
in-labour) and varying levels of state subsidy. At the eve of the Second World 
War enrolment rates in, for example, the Belgian Congo or British Nyasaland 
(present-day Malawi) exceeded 30 per cent, whereas the government 
budgets allocated to education were nothing compared to the Netherlands 
Indies (Frankema 2012; 2013, Dunkerley 2009). Per student expenditure in 
Nyasaland in 1938 did not even exceed $0.50, almost thirty times less than in 
the Netherlands Indies. Yet, primary school enrolment rates in 1938 were about
35 per cent against 17 per cent in the Netherlands Indies. Of course, the rapid 
rise in enrolment rates in these African colonies was only possible because of 
large concessions to quality, but that is not the point to make here. What this 
shows is that colonial states with limited budgets had options to tap into, and 
build upon, private education initiatives.
The subsidy ordinance of 1871 sent a considerable number of missionary 
schools into financial difficulties. Some had to close their doors and others 
were taken over by the local government and transformed into public schools 
4
 Two years later, in 1919, this was extended to universal adult suffrage.
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(gouvernementsscholen). Since the colonial authorities could now rightfully 
claim state neutrality in religious education, they could easily continue to 
refuse support to Islamic schools, which they viewed with suspicion. Colonial 
officials maintained that Islamic teachers paid insufficient attention to basic 
skills of reading, writing, and algebra. More importantly, however, the Islamic 
schools were also considered as a potential breeding-ground for anti-colonial 
conspiracies. Leaders of the Islamic nationalists belonged almost without 
exception to the educated class of Islamic scholars (ulama) and the Muslim 
reform movement that emerged in the Minangkabau (Central Sumatra) during 
the 1900s stood at the basis of the Sarekat Islam.
The Taman Siswa (garden of pupils) was another influential nationalist 
movement aiming at uniting and emancipating Indonesians of various social 
classes through a schooling campaign. The colonial government accused the 
Taman Siswa movement of communist sympathies. A number of laws in the 
1920s and 1930s sought to prevent the spread of so-called wilde scholen (wild 
schools), thought to spread subversive ideas. The Wild School Ordinance 
of 1932 stipulated that all teachers working in unrecognized schools should 
register themselves with the local authorities and undergo a ‘quality check’ by 
an official state representative. The protest against the ordinance was fierce, 
and the government had to repeal the law only a few months later (Tsuchiya 
1987: 151-197).
Ironically, it was the expansion of Islamic schools in the late nineteenth 
century that enhanced the re-appreciation of missionary education by a new 
generation of Dutch politicians, as missionaries could help to constrain Muslim 
activism in the Outer Islands (Noer 1973: 162-175). In addition, the idea 
that the missionary schools could serve as a cheap alternative to the more 
expensive public schools also gained ground. Hence, the subsidy ordinance 
of 1871 was repealed in 1895. In 1909 Hendrikus Colijn, the leader of the 
confessional party ARP (Anti Revolutionaire Partij) and later prime minister 
of the Netherlands (1925-26 and 1933-39), even went as far as to suggest that 
missionary schools should be leading in the spread of popular education. In 
his view the educational philosophies of the missionary schools aligned much 
better to the daily life experiences of the people in the desa.
At the turn of the century public schools were again outsourced to the 
missionaries. But despite this re-appreciation, the missionaries were not in 
a position to occasion a major breakthrough. When the government handed 
00-MI-39,-No 2-2013.indd   322 02/06/2014   15:42:20
| 323
back the public schools in Minahassa to the NGZ (Nederlandsch Zendings 
Genootschap), the largest Dutch Missionary Society, the local population 
protested vehemently as they feared the handover would involve a serious 
loss of quality. Indeed, the secular vernacular village schools became the cheap 
alternative to the gouvernments scholen the Dutch were looking for, but to 
which extent they offered better quality than the average missionary school is 
a question still unanswered. What seems certain, however, is that the incapacity 
of the Dutch to ‘make up their mind’ on how to organize the development of 
popular education resulted in a waste of time and resources.
CONCLUSION
Building upon Anne Booth’s extensive work on the differentiated evolution 
of colonial education systems in East and Southeast Asia, I have attempted to 
probe a bit further into the underlying causes of the poor Dutch legacy. I have 
argued that the spread of popular education was not only hampered by a lack 
of financial commitment, but also by serious inequalities in the allocation of 
the education budget and a general reluctance to support private education 
investment initiatives. This resulted in a ‘missed opportunity’ to open up access 
to education to Indonesians at much faster pace than what was achieved in 
practice.
Instead of repeating the details of the argument, I prefer to point at two 
possibilities for future comparative research á la Booth. First, it is interesting to 
note that the Dutch commitment to the principle of laïcité is shared in common 
with the French, but not with the British or the Belgians. In this respect it 
would be worthwhile to study possible similarities between French colonial 
education policies in Indochina and sub-Saharan Africa, and those discussed 
above. In many cases (not all), the French displayed a similar reluctance 
towards missionary education and, contrary to the British, the French were 
also less inclined to support the expansion of private schools through state 
subsidies.
Second, it would be interesting to explore more deeply the particularities of 
colonial educational policies in Islamic areas. In Sub-Saharan Africa there 
existed a sharp divide in the spread of both public schools and Christian 
missionary schools in Islamic and non-Islamic regions (Frankema 2012). In 
Nigeria, for instance, the British permitted missionary activities in the south, 
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but prohibited them in the Islamic north. The Dutch controlled missionary 
settlement with a license system and also differentiated between the Outer 
Islands and Batavia on the one hand, and the core Islamic areas in Java 
and Sumatra on the other. The comparison with other Asian countries with 
large Islamic communities, such as British Malaya or British India, would be 
illuminating as well.
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